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Introduction
One defining feature of a state is its capacity to raise revenues. Whether a state is strong or weak, whether it is determined or yielding, even whether it survives or disintegrates depends ultimately on its balance sheet. Public finances are thus more than a purely economic phenomenon.
Following Joseph Schumpeter's conception of a fiscal sociology they can be perceived as essential determinants of social and political developments, in fact ". . . public finances are one of the best starting points for an investigation of society, especially but not exclusively of its political life" (Schumpeter, 1991, p.101) .
The level and composition of public revenues, in particular, is likely to have a decisive influence on the character of the state. Rulers who depend on revenues from taxation will rule differently than rulers who rely on their own lands or on the exploitation of natural resources. Taxation implies a direct and noticeable transfer of resources from citizens to the state. Most other revenue sources affect citizens less or not at all. Given this critical distinction between tax and non-tax revenues, it can be conjectured that rulers who impose a large fiscal burden on their citizens must offer them in return a voice in policy making. Once citizens feel the financial weight of the state, they are less likely to tolerate an autocratic and unaccountable government. 1
Historical evidence appears to be consistent with this argument. There are several famous examples where attempts to increase taxation by autocratic rulers resulted in revolution and eventually more accountable government. During the early conflicts between Parliament and the Crown in England, the former rebelled against repeated attempts by the kings to expand taxation and simultaneously model the English state into an absolutist monarchy. The French Revolution began as a revolt against the large tax burden imposed by the Ancien Régime to fund its costly wars and sumptuous court life. The American Rebellion even had as its seminal demand that there should be no taxation without representation.
The "taxation causes democratization" hypothesis has recently reemerged in the context of development policies. 2 According to some authors, improvements in the state's capacity to tax 1 That this link between taxation and democracy may exist has been argued by several economic historians. Charles Tilly, for example, notes that as states "... have extracted taxes, they have often initiated cycles of intervention, resistance, repression, and bargaining: state agents demand payment, citizens resist, the government applies armed force, but in the process of overcoming resistance kills of some leaders, buys off others, and announces justifications for the present intervention that imply rules for proper interventions in the future -in short, repression combined with bargaining" (Tilly, 2009, p. 180) . See also the references in Ross (2004) .
2 For recent theoretical work see Amegashie (2012) .
2 could lead to more democracy in developing countries (Moore, 2007; Di John, 2009 ). Yet while the case for the hypothesis appears strong in view of the historical evidence, it is ultimately based on a few admittedly dramatic but perhaps unrepresentative cases.
I study in this paper whether taxation has a casual effect on democracy with a panel dataset consisting of macroeconomic data for 122 countries 3 over the period from 1981 to 2008. As sources of quasi-exogenous variation, I rely on two tax innovations that have seen wide-spread adoptions in the last three decades: the value added tax (VAT) and autonomous revenue authorities (ARA). I argue that countries adopted these two tax innovations primarily for fiscal and economic reasons, i. e. reasons unrelated to their level of democracy. Dummy variables indicating the year of their adoptions can therefore serve as quasi-exogenous instruments for levels of taxation.
The closest methodological predecessor to this paper is the study by Keen and Lockwood (2010) on the causes and consequences of the introduction of value added taxes. These authors explore why countries adopt a VAT and whether revenues increase after the adoption. In terms of the research question, the closest precedent is Ross (2004) who studies the link between taxation and representation for a large panel of countries. However, since his results rely on pooled cross-section regressions, there remains doubt whether he has identified a causal effect. Subsequent contributions on the taxation-democracy link devote more attention to identification, but have a narrower geographical focus. Berger (2009) studies whether regional differences in the investment in administrative capacity by the British colonial authorities in Nigeria affect the contemporaneous quality of government. Baskaran and Bigsten (2013) investigate with panel data from 23 sub-Saharan Africa how fiscal capacity affects the quality of the government.
McGuirk (2011) tests with micro-level public perception data from 15 sub-Saharan African countries whether natural resource rents incentivize rulers to reduce taxation, and whether this effect in turn diminishes the demand for democratic accountability.
A related literature focuses on how natural resource wealth in general and oil abundance in particular -sources of public revenue that do not require the participation of citizensaffect democracy and the quality of government. Notable studies are Ross (2001 ), Herb (2005 , Treisman (2007) , and Tsui (2011) . Another related literature investigates whether aid has the same consequences as natural resource income for democracy (Collier, 2006; Bermeo, 2011) . This 3 A list of the countries included in the sample can be found in Table A .3 in the appendix.
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paper is also related to the extensive empirical literature on the determinants of democracy. A seminal contribution that explores different channels is Barro (1999) . Much of the subsequent literature studies specific causes. For example, Acemoglu et al. (2005) explore the role of education, Acemoglu et al. (2008) study the link between income and democracy, and Persson and Tabellini (2009) study the effects of past experiences with democracy.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, I provide a short description of the elementary features of value added taxation and autonomous revenue authorities and discusses the causes of their spread during the last three decades. I introduce the empirical model in Section 3 and discuss the data in Section 4. The results are collected in Section 5. I conclude in Section 6.
VATs and ARAs as tax innovations
The main idea of this paper is to use quasi-exogenous variation in the efficiency of the revenue collection technology to identify how the fiscal burden imposed on citizens affects the level of democracy in a country. Two remarkable developments in the field of taxation over the last three decades can provide such quasi-exogenous variation: the spread of value added taxes and the increased adoption of autonomous revenue authorities.
The value added tax, first introduced in France in 1948 4 , is in principle a tax on sales. In contrast to retail sales taxes which are charged on the final sale of a product, the VAT is levied at each stage of the production process. However, each producer receives a refund for the VAT he has to pay for input goods. There is hence no cumulative effect of the VAT, a feature that distinguishes it from turnover taxes. The efficiency of the value added tax, when compared to turnover taxes, derives from this feature. When compared to retail sales taxes, the VAT has the benefit of avoiding a complete loss of revenues if a retailer in unable to pay or manages to evade taxation. Value added taxes differ between countries in rates, in exemptions, and in assessment thresholds, yet it is possible to make the case that its defining features make it a particularly efficient tax when compared to other consumption taxes.
Since histories of the adoption the VAT are available elsewhere (see for example Ebrill et al. (2001) and Bird and Gendron (2007) ), I provide here only a short summary of its spread in the 4 Bird and Gendron (2007) list 1948 as the introduction date. Other sources make a distinction between the VAT in its modern form, which was introduced in 1954 in France, and the earlier variant. countries included my dataset. As Figure 1 shows, 27 of the 122 countries in the sample had a value added tax in 1981. 5 By 1990, the number had risen to 43. Most adoptions took place during the 1990s. By 2000, the number of countries with a VAT stood at 85. In 2008, 95 of the 122 countries in the sample had introduced the VAT. 6 The geographical spread of the VAT is depicted in Figure 3 . This figure shows that there are no specific regional patters. The VAT is truly a global phenomenon. The most notable exception is the United States, which is the only OECD country without a value added tax. Keen and Lockwood (2010) study why countries adopt a VAT. According to their results, the importance of the agricultural sector, the number of countries in the neighborhood that already have a VAT, participation in IMF programs, and adverse revenue shocks are positively related to the likelihood that a country introduces a value added tax. A separate study by Desai and Hines (2005) indicates that the reliance on VAT revenues (as share of total revenues) is lower for more open countries. While these studies do not rule out the possibility that political variables, and in particular the level of democracy, affect the adoption of a VAT (they do not include appropriate control variables in their regressions), it nonetheless appears that the prime determinants of the adoption of a VAT are economic and fiscal. Advocacy by international organizations, the structure of the economy, and fiscal considerations seem to be the forces that push countries into introducing value added taxes.
The second notable tax innovation in recent years are autonomous revenue authorities. 7 The idea behind an autonomous revenue authority is to divide tax policy from tax administration, and thereby to professionalize the latter. In practice, the establishment of an autonomous revenue authority has the consequence that tax administration -i. e. assessment, collection, and auditing -is spun off from the Ministry of Finance and given to a separate organization that offers salaries which are competitive with the private sector and that recruits its personnel according to merit rather than political loyalties. The expectation was that this division of tax policy and tax administration would reduce corruption and increase efficiency.
The first revenue authority was introduced in Jamaica in 1981, but its subsequent spread took place primarily in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa (Brautigam et al., 2008) . Figure 2 shows the spread of the ARAs. In 1988, four countries in the sample had an autonomous revenue 5 See Section 4 for data sources. 6 Overall more than 140 countries have introduced by now a VAT. 7 Also known as semi-autonomous revenue authorities or simply as revenue authorities. I am not aware of a study analyzing the causes and consequences of the adoption of an ARA that is as comprehensive as the one by Keen and Lockwood (2010) for the VAT. There is, however, some evidence available from disparate sources. Relying on survey data from several South-American countries and Mexico, Taliercio (2004) argues that ARAs were introduced by the respective governments to signal commitment to a "more competent, effective, and fair" tax administration. Kidd and Crandall (2006) note that the spread of autonomous revenue authorities can be perceived as one example of the global trend toward privatization during the last few decades. They point in particular to international development agencies and private sector consulting firms as the main advocates for the establishment of ARAs. The primacy of fiscal considerations and international advocacy in also stressed by Fjeldstad and Moore (2009) , who provide an overview of sub-Saharan African ARAs. Such observations indicate that the ARAs were primarily implemented for administrative and fiscal reasons. Consequently, it can be conjectured that democracy or other political variables are no significant determinants of whether and when a autonomous revenue authority is introduced.
Empirical model
The empirical strategy to study the causal effect of taxation on democracy is based on a recursive four-equation model that relates democracy to government revenues, and government revenues to the introduction of value added taxes and autonomous revenue authorities. The model is an extension of the one used by Keen and Lockwood (2010) to explain the causes and consequences of the VAT. It is specified as follows: 
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The first requirement implies that democracy should not influence the likelihood of the introduction of a value added tax or of an autonomous revenue authority. This assumption would be invalid if, for example, democracies would like to have higher levels of redistribution and therefore introduce VATs to raise more revenues. Alternatively, democracies could also be more likely to introduce ARAs as part of a general strategy to improve governance. As indicated above, while the extant literature does not point toward the existence of a link from democracy to VAT or ARA adoptions, it does not confirm the absence of such a link either. To address this shortcoming and establish the validity of this instrument, I will adopt several strategies. First, I
will show that the instruments pass standard over-identification tests. Second, I will explore in robustness tests whether any link between government revenues and democracy remains robust if I use lagged values of the instruments, thereby limiting the possibility for reverse causality.
Finally, I will also explore in robustness tests whether controlling for past shocks in non-tax revenue sources (oil or natural resource rents), or the size of the middle class, or past surges in the level of democracy affects the results.
The requirement that there is no correlation between the error terms in the adoption equations and the democracy equation implies that there should be no omitted variables that influence both the level of democracy and the likelihood that a value added tax or an autonomous revenue authority is introduced. This assumption is tenable if the list of control variables in Equation
E
.1 includes all variables that have an effect on both the level of democracy and the likelihood of the adoption of a VAT and an ARA.
In the regressions reported below, I will always control for country fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity between countries and time fixed effects to account for global developments that have affected all countries in the sample similarly. In addition, I include all variables considered by Keen and Lockwood (2010) when explaining public revenues: GDP per capita, openness, the value added in agriculture as percent of GDP, population size, the population share of over 65-and under 14-year olds, and dummy variables for IMF crisis and non-crisis programs. The sources and definitions of these variables can be found in Table A .1 in the appendix. Given this exhaustive list of control variables, it is a reasonable conjecture that the results are not driven by omitted variables.
If reverse causality and omitted variables bias can be ruled out, dummies indicating the presence of the tax innovations are valid instruments for government revenues. But in order to apply these instruments in the current context, two additional requirements must be fulfilled.
First, the tax innovations should not be elements of V , i. e. they should not have a direct effect on democracy. This assumption cannot be explicitly tested, but it is plausible in the current context. There is little reason to expect that the adoption of rather technical tax innovations has a direct effect on democracy. Second, the tax innovations must be related to government revenues to be useful instruments. As I will show below, this requirement is fulfilled as well.
Data
Data on the introduction of value added taxes are primarily taken from Bird and Gendron (2007) . There have been five countries that have abolished a once introduced VAT (Belize, Ghana, Grenada, Malta, Vietnam). Three of these have subsequently re-introduced the VAT (Ghana, Malta, Vietnam). For these countries, Bird and Gendron (2007) provide either only the date of the initial introduction (Malta) or the date of the re-introduction (Ghana, Vietnam).
For one of these countries, Belize, Bird and Gendron (2007) provide no information. I therefore complement their data with information taken from International Tax Dialogue (2005) . Based on these two sources, I construct a dummy variable that is 1 when a country has or introduces a value added tax and else 0.
Data on autonomous revenue authorities are primarily taken from Brautigam et al. (2008) , who provide information on the introduction dates of autonomous revenue authorities in subSaharan Africa, Latin America, and the Caribbean. The data is complemented with information provided in Mann (2004) . As for the value added tax, I construct a dummy variable that is 1 when a country has or introduces an autonomous revenue authority.
In order to measure democracy, I use the POLITY IV project's institutionalized democracy score (Marshall and Jaggers, 2002) . 8 This variable captures whether there are institutions in place through which citizens can influence public policies, whether there are formalized constraints on the power of the government, and whether the civil liberties of citizens is ensured.
The democracy score ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating more democracy.
8 The data is provided in Teorell et al. (2010) .
To measure levels of taxation, I follow Keen and Lockwood (2010) (Greene, 2003, Ch. 5) . Since I will rely on instrumental variables regressions to account for reverse causality and possible omitted variable bias anyway, the use of the general government revenue to GDP ratio instead of the tax to GDP ratio should be unproblematic. Moreover, in many cases the distinction between taxes and other revenues sources is a purely legal one. For example, there are only minor (if any) economic differences between social security contributions and taxes.
In line with Keen and Lockwood (2010) , I drop all countries from the former Eastern Bloc from the sample since there are concerns regarding the reliability of the data in the pre-1992 period for these countries. Moreover, many of them have introduced their VATs while simultaneously implementing several additional reforms, some of which led to significant decreases in government revenues. Leaving these countries in the sample would therefore induce some degree of negative correlation between government revenues and the VAT that reflects the special circumstances of these countries during their transformations to a market economy rather than the true revenue effects of the VAT. The final dataset consists of 122 countries and covers the period 1981-2008. Each country provides on average 16 observations to the regressions (see the summary statistics in Table A .2 in the appendix). That the weak identification statistic is only barely above the threshold of 4 might be perceived as problematic. Note, however, that weak instruments will tend to bias the coefficient estimates toward the OLS results. Since the OLS results reported in Column VII indicated a negative effect of taxation on democracy, the positive effect found in the TSLS regressions will be -if at all -biased downward. To explore whether this is true, I report in Model XI estimates obtained by limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) which is more robust to weak instruments than TSLS but comes at the cost of making the assumption of normally distributed i.i.d. errors (Staiger and Stock, 1997; Baum et al., 2002) . The LIML estimates are virtually identical to the TSLS estimates, in fact the estimated coefficient for the revenues to GDP ratio is slightly larger than in the corresponding TSLS regression.
Results

Baseline results
Overall, the estimates from the preferred model (Column X) indicate that an increase in the revenues to GDP ratio by one percentage point increases the POLITY democracy score by around 0.4 points. These values imply that taxation has a mild positive effect on democracy. If Rwanda, which is at the 25th percentile of average government revenues to GDP ratio (18.58%)
were to increase its level of revenues to that of Switzerland, which is at the 75th percentile for the government revenues to GDP ratio (33.84%), it could improve its democracy score by around 6.1 points. Since Rwanda's average democracy score was 0 during the sample period, the results suggest that by increasing the revenues to GDP ratio by about 15 percentage points Rwanda could reach a level of democracy that is on par with Namibia (average democracy score of 6.0) or Mali (average democracy score of 6.75).
Robustness checks
Quasi-randomness of tax innovations
One concern with the baseline results is that there remain omitted variables that affect both the likelihood that a country adopts either of the tax innovations and the level of democracy.
It is possible that countries are more likely to invest in enhancing the capacity of the tax administration if they experienced a sudden decrease in oil or natural resource revenues in the recent past. At the same time, shocks to natural resource incomes might increase political instability and result in revolutions (leading to either more or less democracy). Alternatively, countries that are on a path to become more democratic might also be more likely to adopt a VAT or an ARA. That is, countries that experience increases in democracy might introduce value added taxes to increase their revenues because they want to expand redistributive spending.
Another possibility is that countries which become more democratic might want to improve governance in general and introduce an ARA for this reason.
A similar concern is that the structure of the economy has an effect on both democracy and the likelihood of introducing a VAT or an ARA. In particular, it is possible that the emergence of a manufacturing sector will result in the formation of a middle class. It has been argued by some authors that a large middle class will result in more demands for democratic accountability (Johnson et al., 2007) . At the same time, the existence of a middle class makes it worthwhile for the government to invest in its tax administration. The GDP per capita variable and the country dummies alone may not sufficiently control for these effects.
To address such concerns, I collect in Table 2 regressions where I relate the likelihood that either a VAT or an ARA is introduced to variables measuring possible revenue or democracy shocks in period t − 1 and the importance of the middle class in period t. That is, I estimate 13 Equation E.3 and E.4 in order to observe whether the types of shocks listed above or the importance of the middle class affect VAT or ARA adoptions.
To account for natural resource revenue shocks, I control for lagged change (i. e. lagged first difference) in oil rents as share of GDP and lagged change in natural resource rents as share of GDP. To account for past shocks to the level of democracy, I control for the lagged change in the democracy index. As proxy for the importance of the middle class, I use the contribution of the manufacturing sector to value added as share of GDP. All models are estimated with OLS.
The upper panel of Table 2 presents the results for the VAT. I find that none of the four additional control variables are significant. Neither revenue nor democracy shocks nor the importance of the middle class affect the likelihood that a value added tax is adopted. The lower panel of the table presents the corresponding regressions for autonomous revenue authorities.
The results again indicate that none of the additional variables are significantly related to the likelihood that an ARA is adopted.
The results in Table 2 suggest that the exclusion of the variables measuring revenue or democracy shocks or the size of the middle class from the second stage (i. e. Equation E.1) is appropriate. To confirm this conjecture, I report re-estimations of the baseline regressions where I explicitly control for each of these variable. Table 3 collects the result. I find that only past democracy shocks are significantly related to the level of democracy in period t. This is, however, expected as countries that had a significant increase in democracy in the past should have higher levels of democracy today. None of the revenue shocks nor the manufacturing share variable are significantly related to democracy. On the other hand, the government revenues variable is consistently positive. While the coefficient turns insignificant when all control variables are included, it does so presumably because of a significant degree of multicollinearity.
Overall, these results suggest that the baseline findings regarding the effect of government revenues on democracy are not driven by omitted variables, a conclusion that is consistent with the overidentification tests reported for the baseline regressions. Controlling for four possible sources of omitted variable bias, I find that the estimated coefficients for the government revenues to GDP variable remain positive and are either significant or almost significant.
Lagged revenues
Another option to explore the robustness of the results is to exploit the temporal dimension of the dataset. In particular, lagged values of the tax innovations dummies should be less affected by possible reverse causality than contemporaneous values. If the baseline findings were obtained because increases in democracy lead to the introduction of VATs or ARAs, then using lagged values of the dummies to instrument for lagged government revenues should have a large effect on the estimated coefficient for the effect of revenues on democracy. On the other hand, if the coefficient remains of similar magnitude and significance as in the baseline regressions, then the confidence in the baseline estimates should be strengthened.
Therefore, I reestimate Equation E.1 by replacing government revenues variable with its lags.
As instruments for lagged revenues, I use appropriately lagged values of the instruments. Table   4 reports the results for lag lengths up to a degree of five. While the size and significance of the coefficient declines with lag length, the effect of the revenues to GDP ratio remains positive and is in the same order of magnitude as in the baseline models. Increasingly limiting the possibility of reverse causality does not dramatically affect the estimated effect of taxation on democracy, thereby suggesting that the baseline models have identified a causal effect.
Development aid
Another reason why the baseline estimates might be spurious is because of donors' aid policies.
Donors might use aid allocations to persuade recipient countries to become more democratic.
On the other hand, larger aid receipts could in turn reduce the need to implement tax reforms.
The country fixed effects may not sufficiently control for the aid dependence of a country, especially if donors change their aid policies.
In Table 5 , I report different TSLS regressions where I control for aid receipts as share of GDP. The data is taken from the OECD'S DAC database. One problematic feature with this data is that non-aid receiving countries are not included. Consequently, re-estimating Equation E.1 with this variable included reduces the sample size considerably (this is the reason why the aid variable is not included in the baseline specification). Nonetheless, the effect of government revenues on democracy remains positive irrespective of whether the VAT or the ARA dummy are used as instruments one at a time (Column I and II) or jointly (Column III).
One notable effect of including the development aid variable is, however, that the government revenues variable becomes insignificant. At the outset, it is unclear whether the estimate is insignificant because the development aid variable is correlated with both the introduction of the tax innovations and democracy or because of the drop in sample size. To explore this issue, I
replaced the missing values in the development aid variable with 0 for all high-income countries.
The results from re-estimating Equation E.1 with this redefined aid variable are collected in Column (IV). The results indicate that government revenues have a positive and statistically significant effect on democracy when this redefined aid variable is used.
Subsamples
Another concern relates to whether the results are driven by individual countries or specific regions of the world. In particular, almost all developed countries have value added taxes and have been at the same time democratic during the sample period. On the other hand, autonomous revenue authorities have primarily been introduced in Latin-America and Africa.
To check to what extent the results are dependent on a particular region, I re-run Equation E.1 after dropping all countries from that region. Table 6 Overall, it appears that the results rely on the inclusion of sub-Saharan African countries.
While the instruments remain strong when the countries from this region are dropped, the coefficient of the government revenues variables drops to essentially 0. One explanation for this finding might be that African countries have witnessed in recent times both considerable tax reforms and changes in their level of democracy. The variation in other regions of the world during the sample period, both with respect to government revenues or with respect to democracy, might be insufficient to detect meaningful effects once sub-Saharan African countries are excluded from the sample.
Conclusion
Does taxation cause democratization? This paper studies this question with cross-country data by exploiting arguably quasi-exogenous variation induced by two tax innovations that have swept the globe during the last three decades: the value added tax and autonomous revenue authorities. Consistent with the anecdotal evidence from pre-modern Europe and North-America, the results suggest that the magnitude of the fiscal burden has on average a mild positive effect on democracy. This finding survives a number of robustness tests. It appears, however, that especially countries from sub-Saharan Africa drive the results.
From a policy perspective, these findings indicate that development agencies and donors should perceive taxation as one channel through which they can foster democracy. Investing in tax capacity can not only increase the amount of revenues that developing countries can raise, but may also result in more accountable government.
Future empirical work on how taxation affects democracy at the cross-country level should explore additional sources of quasi-exogenous variation in national tax policies. Alternatively, it may be worthwhile to study why the effect of taxation on democracy appears to be particularly dependent on the inclusion of sub-Saharan African countries in the sample. Investigating such questions can provide further insights regarding the link between taxation and democratization. a This table collects TSLS regressions relating democracy to government revenues. Each column collect results from samples that omit countries from one world region. The omitted region is denoted by the heading for the column: "LA" omits countries from Latin America, "ME-NA" from the Middle East and North Africa, "SSA" from sub-Saharan Africa, "NA-WE" from North America and Western Europe, "EA-SEA" from East and South-East Asia, and "R" from the remaining world regions (South-Asia, Pacific, and the Caribbean). c The dependent variable is the POLITY IV democracy index. d Control variables (results omitted): GDP per capita, Openness, Agriculture, Population, Dependency share old, Dependency share young, IMF crisis program, IMF non-crisis program. e Stars indicate significance levels at 10% (*), 5% (**) and 1%(***). f z-statistics in parentheses. g z-statistics and hypothesis tests based on heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation (Newey-West) robust standard errors. 
